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   Arthur Koestler's  Theory of Humor 
                      Robert L. Latta 
 Arthur Koestler put forward a theory of humor that has many facets, that includes, in 
my opinion, a number of insights, and that is surely to some extent correct. My purpose 
in this paper is to test that theory. My method is take a small sample of humorous items 
and, with respect to each of these items individually, to determine to what extent it shows 
the features that Koestler claims are universal features of humor, and to what extent 
Koestler's theory succeeds in explaining why it is funny. 
 The humorous items that I have chosen for this test come from a well-known American 
literary magazine, The New Yorker. The readership of The New Yorker is generally educat-
ed and prosperous. The magazine publishes, among other things, notes and comment on 
life in New York City; short stories and humorous pieces of generally high literary quality; 
essays on current political and social problems; biography; reviews of books, art, music, 
and movies; cartoons most of which represent a mild and sophisticated type of humor and 
many of which  are topical in content; and short unintentionally humorous items of various 
sorts contributed by readers and selected by an editor, who often adds a comment. These 
last are printed in small type and used as fillers. 
 Of the various types of humorous pieces that appear in The New  Yorker, I have chosen 
the last mentioned, the short unintentionally humorous items, as the type I will use to test 
Koestler's theory. To be sure, these items do not constitute a random sample of humor of 
all kinds and origins, for they are all in English, they are all historically recent, they were 
all chosen by an editor for the probability that they would appeal to readers of The New 
Yorker, and none of them is intentionally humorous. On the other hand, they do come from 
varied sources. My main reason for choosing items of this type, however, is the following. 
In formulating his theory, Koestler appears not to have had unintentional humor in mind, 
and thus an examination of unintentionally humorous items might reveal aspects of the phe-
nomenon of humor that are not covered by his theory. 
  Any person whose native language is not English, even if he be highly educated, might 
find it difficult to appreciate the humor of some of the New Yorker items that I shall dis-
cuss. Therefore, in the case of each of these items, to the extent necessary, I shall explain 
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the humor for the benefit of those of my readers for whom English is a second language 
before I  analyze  -dlat  humor  in  theoretical  terms. ' 
  In the course of preparing to write this paper, I have discovered that analyzing an item 
of humor in order to arrive at a theoretical explanation of its comic effect is more an art 
than a science. It is, moreover, a subtle and difficult art. He who undertakes a theoretical 
analysis of a particular item of humor must rely on an introspective feel for the movement 
of  his  own thoughts and feelings, and must bear in mind that other  people  are likely to 
react to that same item in very different ways. I have found, moreover , that the logical 
questions involved in the theory of humor are subtle. These questions are, in fact, fully 
as subtle as the logical questions involved in problems of metaphysics. For these reasons , 
as the reader will find, I approach the analysis of particular items of humor, and the 
logical questions that I take up, with some diffidence. 
  First, then, I shall present Koestler's theory of humor. I shall explain certain parts of it 
in some detail, shall merely mention other parts , and shall pass over yet  other parts without 
mention. Then, as a footnote to my exposition of Koestler's theory, I shall go  over  a. few 
 miscellaneous criticisms and questions that arise directly out  of,  what he says. Then  I shall 
test his theory against the items of unintentional humor that I have chosen. Finally, I will 
state my  conclusions concerning the soundness  of. Koestler's theory. 
1. Koestler's Theory 
  As Koestler points out, civilized adult human  beings often laugh  .in  a  more  or less de-
liberate, calculating way on occasions on which  they do  not really feel  amused , in order to 
please a boss, to avoid the appearance of not sharing in the spirit of the  group, and for 
many other reasons. It should be understood  that Koestler's  theory  of  humor is  not meant 
to be applied to cases of this sort, but only to cases in which spontaneous laughter or smil-
ing occurs. 
  Koestler defines humor as "a type of stimulation that tends to elicit the  laughter  reflex .'''. 
It appears to be  his position that smiling faintly without laughing, on the one  hand , and 
laughing violently on the other, define a single continuum of response , and  thus are  to be 
considered responses of  ,the same type.2 
  The stimuli that elicit laughter or  smiling'  show  great  variety. Koestler does an excellent 
job of bringing home the range of these stimuli, which, as  .he points out,  include  such  di-
verse things as physical tickling, puns,  allusions to famous comedians ,  foreign accents, sub-
tle witticisms, visual caricatures, and certain techniques in music. He claims, however , that 
 all happenings and situations that give rise to laughter or smiling , or to put  it another way, 
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all humorous happenings  and situations whatever, despite the fact that they show great  di-
versity, also  show a  single; simple, underlying pattern. This claim is one of the central fea-
tures of- his theory, and therefore I shall explain it in some detail. 
 He  describe§ -the single, universal pattern in question as "the perceiving of a situation in 
two self-consistent but  mutually  incompatible frames of reference or associative contexts."3 He 
refers to this pattern as the "intellectual structure" of humor.4 To clarify the meaning of 
his  claim, that all items of humor whatever show this pattern, he presents and  analyzes 
five verbal jokes. Partly in order to clarify this claim myself, I shall now discuss his 
analyses of three of these jokes. The first joke reads as follows: 
 A- marquis of the court of Louis XV unexpectedly returned from a journey and, on 
 entering his  wife's.  'boudoir, found her in the arms of a bishop. After a moment's hesita-
 tion, the  marquis walked calmly to the window, leaned out, and began going through the 
 motions of blessing the people in the  street. 
 "What  are you doing?" cried the anguished wife . 
   `Monseigneur is performing my functions , so I am performing his."5 
Perhaps I should point out that the Western reader, upon reading the first sentence of 
this joke,  tends to expect the marquis to erupt in verbal or physical violence. Koestler ana-
lyzes this joke in the following way:    
.  . . a little reflection reveals that the marquis's behaviour is both unexpected and 
 perfectly logical—but of a logic not usually applied to this type of situation. It is the logic 
 of the  division  of labour, governed by rules as old as human civilization. But his reactions 
  would have been expected to be governed by a different set of rules—the code of sexual 
  morality. It is the sudden clash between these two mutually exclusive codes of rules—or 
  associative contexts—that produces the comic  effect.' It compels the listener to perceive the 
  situation in two self-consistent but incompatible frames of reference at the same time;  
'mind has to operate simultaneously  on two different wavelengths. While this unusual 
  condition lasts, the event is not only, as is  normally  the case, associated with  'a single 
  frame of reference, but "bisociated" with two.6 
   He adds that he himself coined the term  ̀ bisociation' 
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   . . . to make a distinction between the routines of disciplined thinking within a sin-
  gle universe of discourse—on a single plane, as it were—and the creative types of mental 
  activity that always operate on more than one plane. In  humour, both the  [creation, of a 
 subtle joke and the re-creative act of perceiving the joke involve the delightful mental 
  jolt of a sudden leap from one plane or associative context to  another.7 
 I think  that Koestler's basic point concerning the joke about the marquis is fairly  clear. 
The first sentence of this joke describes a situation in which a man discovers his wife's 
adultery. This sentence activates in the reader a tendency to think along  certain lines. 
Thus, for example, if asked, he will probably be ready to pronounce this or that moral  judg-
ment, with qualifications, on the behavior of the wife and the bishop, and on the various 
possible responses of the marquis. In other words, he already  has  certain more  or, less de-
finite ways of thinking about situations of this sort, and these  ways of thinking are in 
some sense activated or brought into play  by the first sentence. In this  sense, he associates 
the situation with certain patterns of thought, patterns that have to do with sexual behavior. 
The remainder of the joke, however, from the second sentence to the last, the punch line, 
leads the reader to conceive of the situation in a very different way indeed. It leads him, 
namely, to see  it as a situation in which work roles must be reassigned if all the work 
that calls  for attention is to be done. To  put it another way, the reader suddenly comes 
to perceive the situation not as a difficult problem of adultery, but rather as a simple 
problem of reassigning work roles. In this sense, he associates the situation with standard 
patterns of thought that have  to do with the division of labor. But of course, these two 
patterns of thought, the one having to do with sexual behavior and the other with the division 
of labor, have very little to do with each other. Thus the reader "bisociates" the one 
situation with two different "associative contexts." 
 Koestler offers an analysis of the following joke, too: 
   A doctor comforts  his ,  patient: "You have a very serious disease. Of ten persons who 
 catch it, only one survives. It is lucky you  came , to me, for I have recently  had nine patients 
 with  this disease and they all died  .of  it."$  - 
He comments:    
.  . . The doctor thinks in terms of abstract, statistical probabilities, the rules of 
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 which are inapplicable to individual cases; and there is an added twist because, in con-
 trast to what common sense suggests, the patient's odds of survival are unaffected by what-
 ever happened before; they are still one against ten. This is one of the profound paradoxes 
 of  the theory of probability, and the joke in fact implies a riddle; it pinpoints an absurdity 
 that tends to be taken for  granted.' 
Several pages farther on, he identifies the two frames of reference that come into play here 
as "professional versus common sense  logic."10 In this case, I think that Koestler has ana-
lyzed his own example incorrectly; I shall explain why I think so in the next section of 
this paper. For present purposes, the important thing to note is that Koestler identifies 
the two frames of reference that figure in this joke as two types of logic: the abstract 
logic of statistical probabilities, which he says the doctor applies to the situation, on the 
one hand, and the ways of reasoning that are characteristic of common sense on the other 
hand. Both of these types of logic, of course, represent complex intellectual systems that can 
be brought to bear in order to achieve understanding of a situation. 
 The last joke that I shall quote from Koestler is a short one: 
   A masochist is a person who likes a cold shower in the morning so he takes a hot 
 one.11 
Here, a masochist is to be conceived as a person who takes satisfaction in his own  suffer-
ing, a cold  shower, is to be taken to be unpleasant, and a hot one, pleasant. Koestler 
 comments:
   The masochist who punishes himself by depriving himself of his daily punishment is 
 governed by rules that are a reversal of those of normal logic. (A pattern can be con-
 structed in which both frames of reference are  reversed  : "A  sadist is a person who is 
 kind to a  masochist.")12 
Here again I think that his analysis of his own joke is questionable, as I shall explain in 
the next section. For present purposes, all that is necessary is to interpret his analysis cor-
rectly. This, unfortunately, is difficult, because his comments are very short. When he 
speaks of "the rules of normal logic," I take it that he has in mind the proposition that 
a masochist is a person who takes satisfaction in punishing himself, as, for example, by 
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 taking a cold shower in the morning, for this conception of masochists figures in the first 
 half of the joke, and is, moreover, a basic element in normal ways of thinking about mas -
ochism. When he speaks of "a reversal of the rules of normal logic," I take it that he has 
in mind the proposition that a masochist is a person who takes satisfaction in omitting to 
punish himself, for this conception of masochists figures in the second half of the joke, 
 and is, moreover, a straightforward reversal of the first conception . It appears, however, 
that Koestler does not conceive of the two frames of reference that he asserts to figure in 
this joke as two individual propositions,  for, in the quotation immediately above , using the 
plural "rules," he appears to refer to each of these frames of reference as a set of "rules 
of logic." I take it, then, that it is fair to say that according to  Koestler , the two frames 
of reference that figure in this joke are, on the one hand, normal conceptions of and ways 
of thinking about masochism, and, on the other, some sort of reversal of these normal con-
ceptions and ways of thinking. 
  Now we are in a better position to understand what Koestler means when he writes that 
all items of humor show a certain intellectual structure which consists in "the perceiving 
of a situation in two self-consistent but mutually incompatible frames of reference or asso -
ciative contexts." I shall devote the next few paragraphs to explaining my interpretation 
of this statement. 
  To begin with, it should be noted that here , "a situation" means "one situation," i. e., 
a single situation. Thus, for example , according to Koestler's analysis, in the case of the 
joke about the marquis, the single situation that the reader perceives in two different 
ways is precisely the situation in which the marquis , the bishop, and the wife find 
themselves when the marquis walks into the room . 
  Koestler appears to use the terms "frame of reference" and "associative context" more or 
less interchangeably, but he fails to explain clearly what he means by either of  them . This 
failure is a major weakness in his account, and it creates an important question of inter-
pretation. A frame of reference can be defined as "a conceptual structure to which data, 
ideas, etc. are  related."" An associative context can be defined , likewise, as a conceptual 
structure of some sort with which data, ideas, or a situation must or can be associated for 
purposes of interpretation, understanding, calculation, or the like. These definitions carry 
two implications that should be noted. First, they imply that frames of reference and asso-
ciative contexts are to be conceived as intellectual constructions , and not, for example, as 
patterns of feeling. Secondly, they imply that it is essential to the concept of a frame of 
reference or associative context that frames of reference and associative contexts play a 
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certain specific role in intellectual operations: they are applied to situations for purposes of 
interpretation, understanding, calculation, or the like. In explaining what he means by his 
coinage  "bisociation," Koestler applies the terms "universe of discourse" and "plane [of 
 thought  j" in such a way as to suggest that they denote a type of which the term "associative 
context" denotes a subtype (see page 3 above, third quotation). This in turn suggests 
that in his usage, the terms "associative context" and its synonym or near synonym "frame 
of reference" are to be understood to denote intellectual constructions of some complexity. 
The examples he offers bear out this suggestion. In the case of the joke about the marquis, 
the frames of reference are, he says, "the logic of the division of  labour" and  "the code 
of sexual morality." In the  joke about the doctor, the frames of reference  are, according to 
his analysis, the abstract logic of statistical probabilities, and the ways of reasoning that are 
characteristic of common sense. In the joke about masochists, they  are,, he says, "normal 
logic," i.e., normal conceptions of and ways of thinking about masochism, and a  "reversal" 
of this. All these frames of reference, besides showing some complexity, show the two fea-
tures of frames of reference described just above: they are intellectual constructions, and 
they are applied to situations for purposes of interpretation, etc. It appears safe to conclude, 
then, that in Koestler's usage, a frame of reference or associative context is  an, intellectu-
al construction of some complexity that is applied to an occurrence, situation, or the like 
for purposes of interpretation, understanding, calculation, or the like. 
  It might be useful to contrast the logical type "frame of reference," thus  defined, with 
the types "opinion" and "impression," where the latter are to be understood in the senses 
they bear in sentences like "I am of the opinion that Tanaka is dishonest" and "I have 
the impression that Tanaka is dishonest." "Frame of reference" and "opinion" denote dif-
ferent logical types in that an opinion does not necessarily show logical complexity of the 
degree shown by a frame of reference, and more importantly in that an opinion and a 
frame of reference play different roles in thought. To suggest this difference in the roles 
they play, one might point out that they are spoken of in different terms: a person holds 
his opinion to be true, but applies a frame of reference to a situation or the like in order 
to understand or deal with it. The role of an impression in mental activity is similar to 
that of an  opinion: a person holds his opinion to be true, or has the impression that such 
and such is so. 
  Koestler does not explain clearly what he means by "self-consistent" or "mutually incom-
patible," either. Presumably, to say that a frame of reference is self-consistent is to say that 
it shows internal logical consistency of some sort. Thus, for example, the code of sexual 
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morality applied by an intelligent, middle-aged, married , female white Catholic resident of 
Philadelphia in 1983 in judging the sexual conduct of others is likely to be  self-contradic -
tory to only a limited extent, and the principles of the division  of  labor applied by success -
ful managers in business no doubt show little or no self-contradiction . Presumably, to say 
that two frames of reference are mutually incompatible is to say that for some reason or 
other, it does not make sense to apply both of them to one and the same situation . Thus, 
for example, it does not make sense to apply both what may roughly be called the Christian 
code of sexual morality and the principles of the division of labor to the situation in which 
the marquis found himself, in that these two different frames of reference in some sense 
entail two very different ways of responding, ways of responding that are incompatible in 
that a person cannot adopt them both . 
  As Koestler points out, to describe a logical structure that all items of humor share is 
not to present a complete theory of humor . For to describe such a structure is not to ex-
plain the essential role of emotion in humor. Having described, then, what he takes to be 
the "intellectual structure" of humor , he proceeds to give an account of what he calls its 
 "emotional d
ynamics." He begins by attempting to identify the biological function of 
laughter. His conclusion is this: 
   . . . laughter disposes of emotive excitations that have become pointless and must 
somehow be worked off along physiological channels of least resistance .'4 
He defends this conclusion , in part, by pointing out that laughter often occurs when a 
situation that at first appeared to be dangerous is suddenly perceived to carry no  threat .15 
In cases of this sort, it is indeed clear that laughter serves to discharge emotional tension
, 
more specifically, fear, that has turned out to be superfluous . 
  Koestler claims, and I see no reason to doubt , that all items of humor can be placed 
along a continuum of refinement at one end of which is the most rough , brutal sort of mer-
riment, and at the other the most sophisticated sort of jesting . The latter sort of humor, 
he claims, blends into  wisdom.' More contentiously , he claims that from one end of the 
continuum in question to the other, all humor involves an element of "aggression or appre -
hension."17 Aggression and apprehension, i.e., hostility and fear, are, of course, connected; 
Koestler takes the position that they are two aspects of a single emotional  response .'8 I 
take his claim that humor always involves hostility or fear to mean that hostility or fear is 
always an element in the feelings to which the joker appeals and in the emotions listener 
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discharges through laughter or smiling. In the present context, "an absence of sympathy 
with the victim of the joke" counts as hostility. Koestler claims that this element of 
hostility or fear is essential to humor, that without it, any humorous item will cease to be 
humorous. He offers various considerations to support this claim. For example, he notes 
that when a drunk falls on his face, an observer will laugh only if he feels hard-hearted 
hostility; if the observer starts to laugh, and if the hostility he feels is then suddenly dis-
placed by sympathy, he will immediately stop laughing. He also mentions the case of teas-
ing, which of course involves a playful sort of hostility. He cites experimental evidence that 
tends to establish that in the humor enjoyed by children, a relatively unsophisticated sort 
of humor which, he suggests, shows the fundamental nature of humor clearly, hostility and 
lack of sympathy play a prominent  part.19 He claims that impersonation is funny only if the 
individual impersonated is slightly degraded in the  process." 
 In an especially well-written passage, Koestler likens the element of hostility in subtle 
humor to a flavoring in a dish. I wish to note this passage for future reference: 
   In the subtler types of humor, the aggressive tendency may be so faint that only care-
 ful analysis will detect it, like the presence of salt in a well-prepared dish—which, how-
 ever, would be tastless without it.21 
  Koestler makes several secondary points about the emotional dynamics of humor. He 
claims that in many cases, the tension released in laughter or smiling is tension that has 
been stored in memory. He claims that in some cases, tension eventually released in laugh-
ter is tension of which the subject is unaware. He points out that a very small happening 
can trigger the release of large amounts of accumulated tension in violent laughter. 
He mentions that laughter in one person often stimulates laughter in those around him, 
and points out that this, too, can make for a big response to a trivial stimulus. He points 
out that something associated with a well-known joke or comical situation or pattern or 
style of humor can stimulate laughter or smiling even though it is not in itself funny: he 
mentions Charlie Chaplin's oversized shoes as an example of  this." 
 Koestler puts together his account of the logical structure of humor with his account of 
its emotional dynamics to explain how a joke works. His explanation is this. The initial 
part of a joke describes, alludes to, or suggests a situation or idea, and encourages the 
subject to perceive it in a certain frame of reference. Perceiving it in that frame of refer-
ence naturally activates or builds up emotional excitation. The punch line, however, leads 
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the subject suddenly to conceive of the situation or idea in question in terms of an entire-
ly different frame of reference. His intellect jumps immediately to the new way of  view-
ing the situation. From this new viewpoint, however, the tension that has built up or been 
activated has no use or object. Emotions, however, change relatively slowly, and so the sub-
ject cannot change instantly to a way of feeling appropriate to the new  viewpoint. The 
remaining tension, then, having become superfluous, is discharged in laughter. Koestler 
sums up this explanation in these  words: "It is emotion deserted by thought that is dis-
charged in laughter."23 Thus, for example, consider the joke about the marquis, quoted 
on page 3  above. According to Koestler, it is to be analyzed as follows. The initial sentence 
describes a case in which a man discovers his wife's adultery. A person naturally ex-
periences a degree of emotional excitation upon reading this sentence, for the situation 
described has to do with such things as marital infidelity and sexual jealousy and evokes 
expectations of violence. But, as explained earlier, the remaining sentences of the joke get 
the reader to perceive the situation in a completely different way: they get him to see it 
as a simple and unemotional problem in the division of labor. The sexual feelings and ex-
pectations of violence aroused when the situation was viewed in the first way, however, 
have no point of connection at all with the situation viewed in this new way. These feel-
ings are now without use or object. But the reader's emotional constitution is such that he 
cannot switch them off instantly, and cannot instantly convert them to feelings that are 
appropriate  to the new way of viewing the situation, and so they are discharged in laugh-
ter. 
  An interesting implication  of this account, one to which Koestler alludes, is the follow-
ing. If  human emotion adapted to new situations, and new ways of perceiving situations, 
as quickly as the human intellect comprehends or formulates them, then people would not 
laugh at jokes, i.e., there would be no such thing as a joke. 
  Koestler claims that his theory applies to all items of humor whatever. It might be in-
structive to list some of the many forms of humor that he attempts to bring under his theo-
ry: puns and spoonerisms; the picaresque novel; comic verse; the bogus proverb (e. g., 
Lewis Carroll's "Take care of the sense and the sounds will take care of  themselves"); 
nonsense verse; satire and allegory; the practical joke; the jack-in-the-box; the man/ 
animal hybrid (e.g., Mickey Mouse); imitation and impersonation; parody; the playful 
behavior of young animals and children, which, of course, often strikes adults as amusing; 
deformity, which children and others whose tastes are coarse often see as comical; for-
eign accents and foreign behavior, of which the same is true; the phonograph needle that 
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gets stuck and repeats the same note over and over; tickling, which, Koestler claims, 
evokes laughter only when the tickler is perceived as a mock attacker and inspires a little 
 fear  ;24 the distorting mirror at the amusement park; visual caricature; and humor in 
music. 
  Koestler argues that there are close connections and no sharp boundaries among humor 
art, and science. I shall not,  however, be concerned with this aspect of his theory. 
  In outline, then, for present purposes, the salient features of Koestler's theory of humor 
are the following four. First, appreciating any item of humor involves thinking of a given 
situation or conception in two  quite distinct frames of reference, each of which shows log-
ical consistency within itself, but which are incompatible with each other in that it does 
not make sense to apply both of them to the situation or conception in question. Secondly, 
the biological function of laughter and smiling is to discharge superfluous emotional exci-
tation. Thirdly, all humor involves hostility or fear—i.e., hostility or fear is always an ele-
ment in the feelings to which the joker appeals and in the feelings which the listener  dis-
charges in laughter or smiling. This element is essential to humor. Fourthly, in every 
case in which a person appreciates an item of humor, he laughs or smiles because his in-
tellect switches suddenly from one frame of reference to another, and thus leaves the emo-
tions that arose in him in connection with the first frame of reference without any object. 
This is all that I shall have to say by way of expounding Koestler's theory. 
2. Questions That Arise Directly out of Koestler's Discussion 
  As I wrote in my introductory remarks, this section is a footnote to the previous  sec-
tion.. The questions that I take up here are miscellaneous, and my discussion of them is 
brief. 
  First, then,  on- page 2 above, I point out that Koestler defines humor as "a type of stim-
ulation that tends to elicit the laughter reflex." This use of the indefinite article "a" is 
a bit puzzling, for Koestler does not make it clear whether he means "one type of stimu-
lation among others " or "any type of stimulation " If  he means the former, i.e., if 
he means that humor is one type of stimulation among others that tends to elicit the laugh-
ter reflex, then his definition is not very informative, for in this case, he has not explain-
ed  what  type of stimulation is in question. But if he means the latter, i.e., if he means 
that humor is any type of stimulation that tends to elicit the laughter reflex, then the 
soundness of his definition is perhaps questionable, for it is conceivable that there are cul-
tural groups among which certain types of stimulation tend to elicit spontaneous laughter 
in the absence of amusement of any kind. He remarks that laughter  indicates the  occur-
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rence of something humorous  in the way in which the clicking of a Geiger counter  indi-
cates the presence of radioactivity.25 This strongly suggests that he means that humor is 
any type of stimulation that tends to elicit the laughter reflex. I shall, however, pass over 
this question without further comment. 
 On pages 4 and 5 above, I present and discuss briefly Koestler's analysis of the joke 
about the doctor. To repeat, I think that he has analyzed this joke incorrectly . Surely he 
is mistaken to assert, as he does, that the laws of statistics are not applicable to individual 
cases. If in fact you are suffering from a certain illness, and if in fact only one person out 
of ten with that illness survives, then that statistic does indeed carry  information about 
your individual case. What Koestler calls an "added twist" is in fact not a twist,  but the 
very crux of the matter. The joke is funny not because the reader's intellect makes a leap 
from "professional logic" to "common sense logic," as Koestler claims, but rather because 
the reader first gets the impression that the doctor's reasoning is sound, sober, and profes-
sional, and then sees that it is unsound to the point of being silly. Contrary to Koestler, 
if two frames of reference do indeed figure in this joke, they are not "professional logic" 
and "common sense logic." What, then, are they? Perhaps they are sound, sober, profes-
sional reasoning on the one hand, and blatantly unsound reasoning on the other. If this 
analysis is correct, however, it presents a  difficulty for Koestler's theory. He asserts that 
in every item of humor, each of the two or more frames of reference that come into play 
is "self-consistent." But what does it mean to say that this blatantly unsound reasoning is 
 self-consistent? 
 On pages 5 and 6 above, I present and discuss Koestler's analysis of the joke about the 
masochist who takes a hot shower in the morning. Here, too, I think that his analysis is 
incorrect. He identifies the two frames of reference that figure in this joke as "the rules 
of normal logic" and "a reversal of the rules of normal logic." But it is clear, I think, that 
in this case the reader is asked to go along with the following line of reasoning: a maso-
chist takes satisfaction in punishing himself, and so he takes satisfaction in denying him-
self punishment, because that, for him, is punishing. Most likely, this sort of masochism 
does not occur (and if it does, is a very high and refined form  indeed). Viewed correctly, 
the crux of the matter is that the line of reasoning that the joker presents is fallacious. 
Contrary to Koestler, this joke is funny not because the reader is led to flip from one 
self-consistent system of logic ("the rules of normal logic") to an opposite but likewise 
self-consistent system ("a reversal of the rules of normal logic"), but rather because he 
first gets the impression that the joker's  line of reasoning is sound, and then suddenly per-
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ceives that it is, in an outrageous and clever way,  unsound.  But if this  analysis,  is correct, 
and  if there are indeed two  frames of reference that figure in this joke,  then one of those 
frames  of reference is to be described as  outrageously  unsound, reasoning,  and  thus  one 
again the question arises in  what sense,  if in  any; the unsound reasoning can be said to 
 be self-consistent. 
  I shall take  up  .one more point in this section. On pages  8. and 9 above, I briefly dis-
cuss Koestler's position on the role of hostility and fear in humor. He does certainly  estab-
lish that in  very , many cases in which a joke is told and  ,achieves its  effect,, hostility or 
fear is appealed to and discharged. Perhaps there  is  some reason, beyond the frequency 
of their occurrence, why  hostility  and fear should be discharged in laughter particularly 
frequently.  I. don't think that Koestler has established, however,  that one or the  other, is 
in every case  essential to humor. For one thing, he gives no  systematic argument in favor 
 of,  this conclusion,  i.e.,, no argument that might reasonably  be  said, to cover  all  possible 
cases. For another thing, which perhaps  comes, down in the end to the same thing, he 
 gives,  no satisfying explanation, indeed, he gives  ,no explanation at all, to show why hostility 
 or  fear should in every case be essential. He points out that  a single item of  humor may 
have many different  emotional flavors. He does not,  however, explain why one of  ,these two 
particular flavors must always be present. 
3.  A. Test of Koestler's Theory : Unintentional Humor 
 In this section,  I, shall analyze five examples of unintentional humor  taken  from The 
 New. Yorker. As  I  wrote.. in  the introduction to this paper, with respect to each of these 
items; I  shall attempt to  determine to  what extent it shows the features that Koestler 
 claims  are universal features of humor, and to what extent Koestler's theory  succeeds in  ex-
plaining why it is funny. 
  The first item that  I shall examine reads as follows : 
 (I) The  first ice cream  cone  rolling  machine was invented in 1924,  but the first ice 
 cream cone dates back to 1904 at  the Louisiana  Purchase  Exposition. An  ice cream 
  salesman purportedly gave his  lady friend an ice  cream'  sandwich and some flowers and 
 she used one layer of her  sandwich to make a  vase  for the flowers, rolling it in the shape 
  of a cone. She did the same  with  the other layer of the sandwich  to hold the ice 
  cream. —Youngstown (Ohio)  Daily Vindicator. 
  Then it was time to go home and get cleaned up.26 
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  I shall refer to this as item  (I). The informational article that forms the first part of 
this item was, of course, quoted by The New  Yorker from a newspaper called the Youngstown 
Daily  Vindicator. The comment "Then it was time to go home and get cleaned up" was 
made by an editor at The New Yorker, and was intended to be funny. 
  To my taste, item  (I) is mildly funny. I would explain its humorous effect as follows. 
The article from the newspaper is clearly meant to entertain, but it is  meant= to entertain 
by instructing: it instructs the reader on a historical event of some slight importance, 
and the reader learns. The comment by the editor at The New Yorker, of course, suggests 
that the lady in question, in the course of manipulating her ice cream sandwich in the 
ways described, got ice cream on herself and her clothes and had to go home to get 
cleaned up. Given the date of the occurrence, 1904, and the occasion, the reader might well 
imagine a very proper, formal lady wearing a long, elegant dress, and might well imagine 
her being very frustrated at getting ice cream  on it. The reader first thinks of  the  occur-
rence in  question, then, as a historical event  of some slight  significance, and then sudden-
ly is  'led to think of it in a  very different way indeed, viz., as an occurrence that consists 
simply  in a grown woman spilling ice cream on herself like a child. The mental set asso-
ciated with the first way of viewing the situation is fundamentally serious and thus involves 
a small degree of tension, but this seriousness and tension are inappropriate to the second 
way of viewing the situation, and so the tension is released  in smiling, or, perhaps, a chuckle. 
  I think that  Koestler's theory  fits item  (I) rather well.  It is, I think, plausible to claim 
that two frames  of reference  come into play here. These can, perhaps, be identified as 
human history, or the history of minor  events, on the  one  hand, and petty daily failure 
and frustration  on the  other. I see no reason to deny that these function in the present 
instance as frames of reference. It can, perhaps, be maintained that these two frames of 
reference are mutually incompatible in that adopting first the one and then the other en-
courages the typical reader to form two different mental sets that are not simultaneously 
tenable. The mental set encouraged by the first frame of reference ("Let's learn something 
about history!") is purposeful, but that encouraged by the second ("What an awful mess!") 
is  not. The reader does shift from the first frame of reference to the second, and when 
he does,  the  slight tension associated with the first is released. It is, moreover, plausible 
to claim  that the comment added by the  New Yorker editor is  somewhat hostile, in two 
ways. First, it suggests that the lady who figures in the article was a somewhat  foolish 
and clumsy person. Secondly, it turns the article to comic purposes, and this, I think, tends, 
if only momentarily, to make the writer of the article appear stiff and pedantic, for he did 
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not intend his article to be funny. 
  Here is another item of humor from The New  Yorker: 
 [II) PYRRHIC VICTORY DEPARTMENT 
     [Letter received by a member of the Dartmouth College Class of  '56) 
 DEAR CLASSMATES: 
    Our tremendously successful and never to be forgotten 25th Reunion marked another 
  turning point for the Class of 1956. Having passed this  memorable milestone, we are 
  now eligible to participate in the Dartmouth Bequest and  Estate Planning  PrOgram.  .27 
"PYRRHIC VICTORY DEPARTMENT" is a heading added by the editor at The New 
Yorker to enhance the humorous effect of the item. A Pyrrhic victory is a victory won or 
a goal gained  at too high a cost. Bequests and estate planning, of  course, have to do with 
leaving one's wealth to others at one's death. 
  To my taste, this item is very funny indeed. But why does it elicit  laughter? I think it 
is fair to say that the first sentence tends to fill the reader's mind with ideas of success, 
memorable experiences, and upward progress, and thus creates a light, happy, excited, up-
beat mood. In sharp contrast, the second sentence brings thoughts of aging and death, 
and thus tends to create a downbeat, gloomy mood.  Thus, this item is rather unusual 
among items of humor, in that the shift is from a light mood to a heavy one, whereas the 
shift is usually from the  serious, to the light. All this suggests, I think, that the  emotional 
dynamics of this item are best analyzed as follows. The happy, optimistic feelings evoked 
by the first sentence are undermined by the downbeat, gloomy thoughts stimulated by the 
second sentence. For this reason, these happy feelings become psychologically unsustain-
able, and thus are released in a laugh. 
  How  well does Koestler's theory fit item  [H] ? I think that it fails to fit at one  impor-
tant point. I have in mind  •Koestler's assertion that hostility or fear is  essential to every 
item of humor and is always among the feelings to which the joker appeals and among 
the emotions that his listener discharges through  laughter  or smiling (see pages 8-9 above). 
What role, in fact, do hostility and fear play in item  [II] ?  I can think  of no  reason 
to say that hostility plays any role at all  here. As for fear, the second sentence, with its 
reference to bequests and estate planning, i.e., planning for one's death, might  to a cer-
tain extent activate fear of death in some readers. However, if my analysis of item  CIO is 
correct, what is discharged is not the emotional content of the second sentence, but rather 
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the happy, upbeat excitement generated by the first sentence. Therefore, if my analysis is 
correct, contrary to Koestler, the emotions discharged in this case contain no element of 
hostility or fear, but consist entirely of positive feelings. Moreover, what is essential to the 
emotional dynamics of this item, as I have analyzed it, is that the second sentence tends 
to generate negative feelings and thereby undermines the positive feelings generated by 
the first sentence; it is not necessary to the humorous effect that these negative feelings 
include elements of hostility or fear in particular. Taken together with the fact that the 
emotions discharged do not include hostility or fear, this suggests, contrary to Koestler, 
that the element of hostility or fear is not essential to humor. 
  The next item that I shall examine is short and, to me, very funny: 
 (III)  IMPORTED BEDSPREADS BY  GL  OM  AR 
   Leaf design embroidered on fine polyester voile. Machine washable in champagne. 
   —Adv. in the Seattle Times . 
   And that, friends, is living.28 
This advertisement, quoted by The New Yorker from the Seattle Times, contains a mis-
print which perhaps represents a computer error of some sort. Clearly, the copywriter intend-
ed something like "Machine washable in warm water." The comment "And that, friends, 
is living" was  made by the editor at The New Yorker; as used here, "living" means "liv-
ing well," "living high," or "living luxuriously." The misprint suggests that some people 
 are in a position to wash  their , bedspreads in champagne and might  quite reasonably be 
expected to do so. 
 How are the emotional dynamics to be described in this  case? Certainly there is noth-
ing funny in this item until one reaches the word "champagne." This word generates an 
absurdity, in that it is absurd to imagine people washing bedspreads in champagne. This 
absurdity, of course, is not a logical or conceptual absurdity, but rather what one might 
call a practical absurdity. In a way, it fits into the context very well: absurd though it is 
to imagine people washing bedspreads in champagne, it suggests a high degree of luxury, 
and the expressions "imported," "by Glomar," and "fine voile," which precede the ref-
erence to champagne, all suggest high quality and luxury, too. Now it appears safe to as-
sume that for most readers of this item, what one might call "normal seriousness" prevails 
until they see the word "champagne." Normal seriousness here includes the significant 
tension involved in the effort to read and understand the advertisement. But then the  ab-
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surdity generated by the word "champagne" undermines this serious mood and thus cau-
ses the tension that it entails to be discharged in laughter or smiling. The comment by 
the New Yorker editor sustains the comic effect in several ways. First, it  encourages., the 
reader to dwell upon the absurdity. Secondly, the tone of this comment, in contrast  to the 
formal, somewhat pretentious tone of the advertisement, is very informal, primarily due to 
the inclusion of the word "friends" and the use of the word "living" in the sense explain-
ed above. This informality, too, helps to undermine the "normotension" that the advertise-
ment sustains up to the misprint "champagne." 
  Perhaps it is worthwhile to note, parenthetically, that in many cases, holding an absurd 
image in one's mind for some time—e.g., the image of a rich lady washing a fine  bed-
spread in a washing machine with champagne instead of water—proves a delectable expe-
rience. Why is  this  ? Perhaps it is because in the cases in question, holding the absurd 
image prolongs a pleasurable discharge of emotional tension. 
 Does Koestler's account of how a joke works apply to item  UM? I have given reason 
to believe that his account does fit the joke about the marquis rather well (see pages 3-4 
and 10 above). Let us, then, compare this joke with item  (III) ._ The first part of  the joke 
about the marquis serves to make a certain situation the object of the reader's attention: 
I mean the situation in which the marquis, the wife , and the bishop find themselves when 
the marquis steps into the room. It also gets the reader to perceive that situation  in a 
certain frame of reference. The remainder of the joke leaves that same situation  as the 
object of the reader's attention, but gets him to perceive it in a different frame of refer-
ence. Thus, the workings of the joke about the marquis show two features that the  work-
ings of any item of humor must show if they are to accord with Koestler's theory: (1) an 
intellectual transition takes place (from one frame of reference to another), but the object 
of the reader's attention remains the same through that transition; and (2) the way that 
object of attention is perceived in the second part of the joke is different from  the way 
it is perceived in the first part (for when the reader comes to the second part of the 
joke, he suddenly comes to perceive the object of his attention, the subject matter of the 
joke, in a different frame of reference). Now what about the workings of item  MU? Do 
they too show these two features ? I think that this is a delicate issue , and I  shall  ap-
proach it by putting a series of questions. First, then, in the case of item  (III), precisely 
what is the object of the reader's attention up to the point at which he reads the word 
"champagne"? I think that the answer is clear: in the case of the ordinary reader, the 
object of attention is simply the subject matter of the advertisement—that is to say , the 
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bedspreads being advertised. The object of attention is not, I think, any situation, for the 
advertisement does not describe any situation. To be sure, an  ad  vertising man who felt a 
strong professional interest in the relative effectiveness of different methods and styles of 
advertising  might' focus  his attention not on the subject matter of the advertisement, the 
bedspreads, but  rather' on the advertisement itself as an effort in sales promotion. Clearly, 
 however, this represents an unusual sort of case. My next  question is this: Precisely what 
is the  object of the reader's attention just after he assimilates (reads  and takes in the im-
port of) the word  "champagne"? Does his attention remain  fixed on  the same object, the 
bedspreads that form the subject matter of the advertisement, or does it jump  to a new 
 object?  This is,  I think, an especially delicate question, but, judging by my own reactions, 
 I think it  accurate to say that the reader's attention does  not remain focussed on the  bed-
spreads, but rather jumps to  a new object—viz., the absurd image of a person washing 
bedspreads in a washing machine in champagne. Now let us  ask: Upon assimilating the 
word "champagne," does the reader suddenly come to see the bedspreads in a new  per-
spective? I see no reason to say so. Both just before  and after he assimilates the word 
"champagne ," he  perceives the bedspreads simply as machine-washable bedspreads,  import-
ed, by  Glomar, that show a leaf design embroidered on polyester voile. In short, an intel-
lectual transition does  occur in the case of  item  (III). It is not, however, a transition 
from perceiving  a situation in one frame of reference to perceiving that same situation in 
a different frame of reference. It is, rather, a transition from reading a description of  phys-
ical, objects of a  certain:  type and forming an incipient judgment of their value, to form-
ing an  absurd image that involves physical objects  of that type. The transition is not from 
one frame  of reference to another, but rather from intellectual activity of one description 
to  intellectual  activity of another description. But if this analysis is correct, then, of course, 
Koestler's account of how a  joke works does  not apply to item  (III). 
 Clearly, fear plays no  role at all in the emotional dynamics of item  [III]. It seems almost 
equally clear  that hostility plays no role. If my analysis of this item is correct, the ten-
sion discharged  in this case is simply the tension involved in the  effort to understand and 
evaluate the contents  of the advertisement, and this does not  include any element of  hostil-
ity.  It'  is perhaps plausible to say that the act of quoting the advertisement complete with 
the misprint  and  then  adding a comment that leads the reader to linger over the  absurd-
ity, as the editor at The New Yorker does, shows hostility or at least a  lack of  sympathy 
 for: the  Glomar: company, or the Seattle Times, or the copywriter at the Seattle Times, for 
the misprint  does  make  them look slightly  silly. Item  (III), however, would be very funny 
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as it appeared  originally in the Seattle Times, without any comment.  Therefore,, even  if 
the actions of the New Yorker editor manifest hostility, that hostility is not essential to the 
comic effect. Perhaps it will be said that even as it appeared in the Seattle Times, this 
item will  to a degree excite the reader to contempt for Glomar, the newspaper, or  the  copy-
writer. But this, I think, depends on the personality of the reader. 
 The next item that I shall examine reads as follows: 
 [IV] HOW'S THAT  AGAIN  ?  DEPARTMENT 
   [From a letter to the editor  [of] Harper's by a member of the Nuclear Regulatory 
 Commission] 
   There is a fifty-year pattern to U. S. energy pricing, in which the government, in the 
 name of protecting us from supply shortage and high prices, actually follows policies  de-
  signed to prevent the  reverse." 
The question "How's that again ?" which forms the first part of the heading added by 
the editor at The New Yorker, is an informal equivalent of "I didn't  understand  ; please 
say it once  more." "How's that again ?" is not really a regular department in The New 
Yorker. Harper's is a well-known magazine. It is safe to say, and important to note, that 
for the average educated native speaker of English, the final clause of the passage quoted 
by The New Yorker, i.e., the clause "actually follows policies designed to prevent the re-
verse," is incomprehensible on first reading. As a whole, this passage is not well written: 
for example, "fifty-year pattern" is ambiguous, "in the name of" is a poor choice of words, 
and "shortage" and "prices" are not parallel. The fact that the final clause is incompre-
hensible on first reading is perhaps due to a combination of an ill-chosen word and a 
misprint. Specifically, it appears that "actually" should not have been inserted by the writ-
er at all, and that "prevent" is a misprint for "promote." If "actually" is deleted and 
"prevent" is changed to "promote ," then the entire passage becomes easy to understand. 
The insertion of the word "actually" greatly adds to the confusion, because it strongly 
encourages the reader to think that "prevent" is not a misprint. As it stands, with "ac-
tually" and "prevent," the passage quoted has an unintended meaning which can  be' grasped 
with a little thought. This unintended meaning is that the  U. S. government follows 
energy-pricing policies that are designed to prevent low prices  and  prevent the  develop-
ment of a plentiful supply of energy. 
 It is important to note, too, that the passage quoted is funny at first sight, even before 
one  figures out the intended and unintended meanings. Let us ask why this is.  I  ,  think 
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that the emotional dynamics are the following. The  reader  approaches the quoted passage 
seriously and  tries  to understand it. Both the New Yorker heading, which suggests that 
the passage will be difficult to understand, and the opening words of the passage itself, 
which  carry a  fortnal, serious  -tone, encourage the reader  to take this approach.  But then 
the final clause is so confusing, and so obviously  ill-phraSed, that the reader,  'partly on 
account of the difficulty of comprehending, and partly on account of the silliness of the 
writer's wording, momentarily gives up the effort, and the tension entailed by the effort is 
discharged in laughter or smiling. Perhaps, too, some  readers expect or half expect to 
understand  the passage, and when they don't, the tension that is associated with that ex-
pectation is discharged. 
 There are several other  ways in  WhiCh a reader might  react to the  pasSage in question. 
 Having made  but the unintended  meaning, viz., that the U.S. government deliberately 
acts in such a way as to keep energy prices high and the supply of  'energy low, a reader 
might laugh because he thinks it absurd to say that the government would follow such 
 Policies, or  else  'because, far from  thinking it  absurd to say this, he thinks that the writer 
has unintentionally stated the deplorable  fadt that the government does  follow such  policies. 
I myself did not react in either of these ways, however, and I will base my  discussion of 
item [IV) on my first  analysis  'of its emotional dynamics. 
 How well  does Koestler's  theory explain the comic effect of item  ['IV)? The answer, I 
think, is  'nOt well at all,  fOr frames of reference have  nothing to do with the effect in this 
 case. In the first place,  in  this  case,  thinking'  of a situation in a  certain frame of  refer-
ence' is  not  what  causes  tension to  bUild up. What causes tension to  bUild  is  some= 
thing fundamentally different, viz., the effort  'to' understand a  comparatively  complex and 
poorly written  paSsage. In the second  plaCe, in this case, making an intellectual leap to 
a  frame 'of reference is not what leads to a discharge of tension. It is, again,  something 
fundamentally different, viz.,  momentarily giving up the effort to understand a  written 
passage, that leads to laughter here. 
  As I have  said, Koestler takes the position that the biological function of laughter is to 
discharge unneeded emotional tension (see page 8 above). The item under  discussion 
 serves to confirm this particular point in his theory rather well. For in this case, the  read-
er's laugh or smile serves to discharge tension that he has built up in  vain in  that he 
has not succeeded in his first effort to understand the passage. Perhaps it  is, not difficult 
 to  imagine cases in which failure in  a physical effort, as  opposed  to, an intellectual one, 
leads to laughter. Two boys, dressed in  good, clothes,  decide  to take a shortcut  home. 
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This involves jumping over a stream. The jump is wide, but not impossible. The first 
boy jumps successfully. The second boy jumps short and falls into the water, unhurt but 
wet and dirty. It would be quite natural for both boys to laugh at this, if they don't 
perceive the consequences to be too serious. It might be that they laugh partly because 
at first they perceived the second boy as an athletic daredevil, but then came to see him 
as a fool when he fell in. If so, Koestler's theory explains this element in their laughter 
rather well. But it appears reasonable to suggest that in part, the second boy laughs sim-
ply because the apprehension and tension associated with the effort to jump across be-
comes redundant once he has clearly failed. In this case, he laughs not because he has 
come to view his situation differently, but because his situation has changed completely, 
and the apprehension and tension that were appropriate to his former situation of a sec-
ond ago are now inappropriate. The first boy might well identify with the second to a 
certain extent, and thus laugh for the same reason. This example suggests a criticism of 
Koestler's theory which, if sound, is important. To view laughter as Koestler does is to 
view it as the result of making sudden leaps from one frame of reference to another, and 
this is  to  view it as the result of a sort of intellectual acrobatics. But this view of laugh-
ter is perhaps overly intellectualistic. The boy who tenses, physically and psychologically, 
to attempt to leap across the stream, falls short, and laughs away his tension, leaps physi-
cally, not intellectually, into a position in which his tension is redundant. Surely there 
occur many cases of this type. 
 The last item from The New Yorker that I shall examine reads as follows: 
 [V SAN BERNARDINO—Norton Air Force Base transport pilots will literally go 
 out of their way to avoid a mid-air collision with a private plane in the crowded skies 
 above the Inland Empire, officials at a base public flying safety seminar said Sunday. 
 —San Bernardino (Calif.) Sun. 
 Talk about your friendly skies!3° 
"Inland Empire" is , apparently, an informal name for the area around San Bernardino, 
California. 
 The reporter who wrote this sentence for the San Bernardino Sun did not succeed in 
saying what he meant to say, and the humor of this item arises from this fact. In order 
to understand the humor here, it is necessary to distinguish three things: what the re-
porter intended to say; what his words actually mean, which is not the same thing as 
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 what he intended to say; and a certain impression he conveys , an impression that is the 
 outcome of a sort of interaction between his intended meaning and the actual meaning of 
 his words. I shall now explain these three things in this order, and then explain the 
 meaning of the ironical comment added by the editor at The New Yorker. 
   The reporter intended the words "will go out of their way" to be taken in a broad 
 sense in which they mean something like "will make supererogatory efforts," or "will take 
 pains," or "will go to some trouble." By inserting the word "literally," he meant to em-
 phasize that the pilots will make efforts to avoid collisions. Thus, his intended meaning is 
 something like this: You can be sure that Norton Air Force Base transport pilots will , 
 in various ways, make considerable efforts to see to it that mid-air collisions with private 
 airplanes do not occur. This, however, is not what his words actually mean, for he has 
 misused the word "literally." To say that the transport pilots will literally go out of their 
 way to avoid a collision is to say that they will go out of their way in the strict sense of 
the expression. That is, it is to say simply that if one of these pilots, while flying his 
airplane, sees that he is on a collision course, then he will change course, as by banking 
to the left or the right, diving to a lower altitude, or whatnot. Thus, what the reporter 
actually said is simply this: A Norton Air Force Base transport pilot who sees that he is 
on a collision course with a private airplane can be expected to maneuver his own airplane 
in order to avoid a collision. It is clear, however, that he intended to emphasize the 
willingness of the transport pilots to "go out of their way." Thus, to a reader who knows 
the true meaning of the word "literally," the reporter unintentionally conveys the impres-
sion that he is emphasizing the willingness of the transport pilots to change course in 
order to avoid collisions, as if this willingness did not go without saying, but were, rather, 
a remarkable indication of concern and benevolence on the part of the pilots. Note that 
to suggest that it is remarkable that the transport pilots are willing to change course in 
order to avoid mid-air collisions is to suggest that these pilots probably are not willing to 
do much beyond this to see to it that mid-air collisions do not occur. The comment 
"Talk about your friendly skies!" 
was, of course, added by the editor at The New Yorker. 
It contains an allusion to a well-known series of advertisements by United Airlines, adver-
tisements which feature the words "Fly the friendly skies of United!" i.e., choose United 
Airlines because the staff will be friendly to you. Taken straight, in the present context, 
"Talk about your friendly skies!" means "Those transport pilots really are 
very friendly 
and considerate in their attitude towards private pilots!" This comment, however, is defi-
nitely intended to be taken ironically: the editor clearly intended to suggest that if it is 
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remarkable that the transport pilots are willing to take the utterly basic step of changing 
course to avoid collisions, then perhaps they are not very friendly or careful at all. 
 What are the emotional dynamics of item  (V)? I think that they can be described as 
follows. The reader approaches the news story in a serious frame of mind. The newspa-
per dateline and the opening words of the story encourage him to do so. Very quickly, 
however, he encounters an absurdity: the absurdity of emphasizing that the transport 
pilots are willing to change course in order to avoid mid-air collisions and presenting 
this as a news story. (The reporter who wrote the story does not, of course, actually em-
phasize the fact that the pilots are willing to change course, but, as I have explained, he 
gives the impression that he emphasizes it.) This absurdity undermines the serious mood 
in which the reader began, and the tension associated with that mood is spilled in a laugh 
or a smile. 
 Does Koestler's account of how a joke works apply to item  [V)? I find it difficult to 
answer this question, but it appears to me that the answer is no. As I have explained, 
the reader approaches the news story about the transport pilots in a serious frame of 
mind, and subsequently that frame of mind and the tension it entails are undermined by 
an absurdity. Now as I have explained, according to Koestler, the initial part of an item 
of humor describes, alludes to, or suggests a situation or idea, and encourages the subject 
to perceive it in a certain frame of reference. Perceiving it in that frame of reference, 
he says, naturally activates or builds up emotional excitation. The final part of the item of 
humor, however, he adds, leads the subject suddenly to conceive of the situation or idea 
in question in terms of an entirely different frame of reference, and in consequence the 
excitation that has been activated or built up is discharged in laughter or smiling (see 
pages 9-10 above). Let us, then, consider the following question. In the case of item 
 (V), precisely what is it that causes the tension subsequently discharged to be built  up  ? 
If my account of the emotional dynamics of this item is correct, merely reading the date-
line ("SAN BERNARDINO") and the opening words of the story ("Norton Air Force 
Base "), or the dateline alone, encourages the reader to adopt a serious frame of mind, 
and this frame of mind entails the tension subsequently discharged in a laugh. But clear-
ly, the words  "SAN BERNARDINO," or even these words plus the opening few words 
of the news story, do not describe, allude to, or suggest any situation or idea that the read-
er subsequently comes to view in a second frame of reference. This alone suffices to 
show that Koestler's account of how a joke works does not apply to item  [V). In the 
case of item  (V), it is not a transition from perceiving a situation in one frame of  refer-
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ence to perceiving that same situation in another frame of reference that causes tension 
to be discharged, but something quite different—viz., a transition from reading and attempt-
ing to evaluate a news story, to recognizing an absurdity. 
4. Conclusions 
  Koestler's theory does describe the structure and dynamics of some items of humor rath-
er well. The joke about the marquis is an example (see pages 3-4, 10, and 17 above). 
Contrary to Koestler, however, it is not the case that two or more frames of reference 
figure in the logical structure of every item of humor. Item  [IV], the one headed 
"HOW'S THAT  AGAIN  ? DEPARTMENT
," and .my own example of the two boys who 
attempt to jump across a stream, serve, I think, to make this clear (see pages 19-21 above). 
I have discovered no reason to doubt the truth of Koestler's claim that the biological 
function of laughter and smiling is to discharge redundant emotional tension. His 
claim that the element of hostility or fear is essential to humor is, however, highly ques-
tionable. Item  [III headed "PYRRHIC VICTORY DEPARTMENT," and item [III], the 
one that consists of an advertisement for bedspreads plus a comment by the editor at The 
New Yorker, show clearly that neither hostility nor fear need be among the feelings dis-
charged in laughter. Moreover, I think it fair to say that my discussion of these two 
items gives reason to suspect that neither hostility nor fear need be among the feelings to 
which a joker or humorous item appeals (see pages 15-18 above). Koestler's account of 
how a joke works does not apply to all items of humor. It appears not to apply to items 
which turn on the sudden recognition of an absurdity, and in particular, it does not apply 
to item [III] or to item  [VI, the one that begins with the short news story about the 
transport pilots (see pages 16-18 and 21-23 above). 
 In sum, Koestler's theory does fit some items of humor rather well. As a general theo-
ry of humor, however, it fails. To formulate an adequate general theory of humor is sure-
ly a challenging and worthwhile goal, but one that lies beyond the scope of this paper. 
  NOTES 
   1) Encyclopaedia Britannica,  Macropaedia Volume 9, 1980, article "Humour and Wit," page 
      5, left column. 
   2) See Britannica, page 5, left column. 
   3) Britannica, page 6, left column. 
   4) Britannica, page 6, left column. 
   5) Britannica, page 5, right column. 
   6) Britannica, pages 5-6. 
  7) Britannica, page 6, left column. 
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8) Britannica, page 5, right column. 
9) Britannica, page 6, left column. 
10) Britannica, page 8, left column. 
11) Britannica, page 5, right column. 
12) Britannica, page 6, left column. 
13) The Random House College Dictionary, Revised Edition, Jess Stern, Editor in Chief, 
    1975, Random House, Inc., under "frame of reference." 
14) Britannica, page 6, left column. 
15) Britannica, page 6, left column. 
16) Britannica, page 6. 
17) Britannica, page 6, right column. 
18) Britannica, pages 6-7. 
19) For all these points, see Britannica, page 6, right column. 
20) Britannica, page 8, right column. 
21) Britannica, page 6, right column. 
22) For all these points, see Britannica, page 7, left column. 
23) Britannica, page 7, right column. 
24) See Britannica, page 9. 
25) Britannica, page 5, right column. 
26) The New Yorker, April 5, 1982, page 52. 
27) The New Yorker, April 5, 1982, page 179. 
28) The New Yorker, April 5, 1982, page 179. 
29) The New Yorker, April 19, 1982, page 178. 
30) The New Yorker, April 5, 1982, page 200.
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